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Of Witches and Robots:
The Diverse Challenges of
Responding to Unlawful Killings
in the Twenty-first Century
Philip Alston

I. Introduction

F

rom its relatively modest beginnings in 1945, the universal
human rights regime has come a very long way. Few if any of those
who drafted the apparently unthreatening, but nonetheless foundational, provisions of the United Nations Charter dealing with human
rights would have imagined that less than seventy years later the Security Council would have taken action in relation to serious human
rights violations in a significant range of countries, that governments
would have established an International Criminal Court, or that there
would be a wide range of mechanisms that regularly and routinely
hold states to account for their human rights performance across a
very wide range of issues. This is not, however, to suggest that many
of the most egregious human rights problems have been radically ameliorated. They clearly have not. The subjugation of women is a continuing phenomenon in a great many societies, and gender equality
remains an unachieved goal even in the most developed economies.
Racial discrimination is a constant and forms of ethnic and religious
discrimination continue to be both inventive and invidious. Hunger,
the denial of basic health care, and access to decent housing are problems that persist on a vast scale around the world. In addition, torture,
disappearances, and unlawful killings continue to take place in the
majority of states.
The purpose of this article is not to celebrate the institutional and
other achievements of the international human rights regime, nor is it
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to decry the terrible ills that persist side by side with these apparent
achievements. Instead, the goal is to provide a better understanding of
the ways in which the regime has developed and to illustrate some of
the principal challenges that are emerging at the end of the first decade
of the twenty-first century.
The lens that I use in this article to examine these issues is the challenge, long ago accepted as an urgent and pressing one by the international community, of seeking to respond effectively to and finally
eliminating extrajudicial executions, or killings which by definition are
unlawful under the relevant bodies of international law. This term covers many phenomena. They range from killings by government agents
like the police or military in violation of either human rights or international humanitarian law; through official tolerance or encouragement
of death squads, paramilitaries, or other private killers; to the failure to
investigate, prosecute, or punish crimes such as the killing of women
alleged to have brought dishonor to their families through breaking
certain social conventions—so-called “honor killings.”1
It is precisely because of the breadth of the practices involved that
I have chosen to focus on two separate phenomena that might be
thought to lie at different ends of the spectrum of types of extrajudicial
executions. They are the killing of those deemed to be “witches,” a
problem that arises almost entirely in traditional societies, and the killing of targeted individuals by means of unmanned robotic weapons, a
phenomenon which is rapidly becoming ever more feasible as a result
of technological developments. Each of these practices raises a host of
fascinating questions in its own right, but by comparing and contrasting some of the problems they highlight, it is possible to get a general
sense of the type of challenges the international human rights regime
confronts as it seeks to implement one of the most fundamental of all
of the internationally recognized human rights: the right to life.
The essay begins in Part II by looking at both the nature and the
extent of the problem of extrajudicial execution of individuals, usually
women and sometimes children, who are accused of being witches,
most commonly by neighbors or even family members. Part III traces
the emergence of robotic technologies and examines their potential to
use lethal force against human targets without direct human involvement in the decision-making processes. Consideration is then given to
a number of specific concerns to which these developments give rise
and to the possibility of encouraging policy-makers to take steps to
minimize the potential use of such weapons for carrying out extrajudi-
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cial executions. Finally, Part IV seeks to draw some conclusions for the
international human rights regime as a whole from the juxtaposition of
these two very different case studies.
II. Witches
Reports from a surprisingly large number of countries in different
regions of the world indicate that the intentional killing of individuals
labeled as witches remains a significant and very troubling phenomenon. Such killings are by no means a thing of the past, as those familiar
with the better-known historical examples from European or American history might suggest. Before giving an indication of some of the
countries in which such problems are not infrequent, it is appropriate
to recount the circumstances under which I was first forced to confront
the horror and the complexity of this problem.
The town of Paoua, in the northwest of the Central African Republic (CAR), is locally known as the birthplace of a former president of
the republic, but in recent years it has become something of a ghost
town. Because it is far from Bangui, the national capital, it is generally
neglected by the central government. In fact, the area outside the city
center is largely at the mercy of bandits. It is also located very close
to the border with Chad, making it subject to cross-border incursions
by military elements fighting one or the other of the governments,
thus ensuring a significant military presence. I visited on behalf of the
United Nations in February 2008 to investigate unlawful killings. I
was looking into killings attributed to the bandits and the President’s
Republican Guard. There was no shortage of allegations and gruesome
stories of arbitrary killings.
Early one morning, the head of one of the local communities came
to see me and opened up a whole new dimension of the problem. She
pleaded with me to do something about a major problem, which up
until then had been largely invisible. It involved the killing of a number
of women who had been alleged by their neighbors to be witches. Even
more distressing was the fact that the killings had been carried out by
the army in response to requests by the villagers. Her allegations were
corroborated by other sources and the local police chief subsequently
acknowledged other cases involving the killing of witches. As UNICEF
subsequently reported: “Hundreds, or even thousands, of children and
elderly people—women in particular—have been accused of being
witches in CAR. Belief in witchcraft is widespread in the region….”2
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As I sat down to write a report on these incidents, and to identify
the appropriate legal and policy responses to them, I was confronted
with a range of questions that were not so easy to answer. At one level,
there was little complexity. The simple fact was that individuals had
been killed, not on the grounds that they had violated a particular
state law, and certainly not after having undergone any sort of legal
process that might have given them the chance to defend themselves
against the allegations directed at them. There could be no justification for such arbitrary killing, unsanctioned by law. There were, of
course, factual issues that needed to be clarified, such as whether, as
alleged, the military had received financial rewards for undertaking
these killings, but that would only make the situation worse rather
than changing the basic problem. Another complication was that the
government forces apparently had no monopoly on such killings since
the main rebel group active in the country, the Armée pour la Restauration de la République et la Démocratie, was also accused of carrying
out such acts. Ironically, it had been suggested to me that when they
killed individuals, such as the head of the town of Badama who was
accused of being a sorcerer and killed in August 2007, it was done as
part of a larger effort on their part to fill in the law-and-order vacuum
left by the relative absence of the central government authorities from
the northwest of the country.
The more difficult question concerned the type of recommendations
that should be made to the government of the CAR. For a start, the
Criminal Code actually provided that a person convicted of “witchcraft” (charlatinsme and sorcellerie) could face capital punishment, a
prison sentence, or a fine.3 I was not able to identify any recent cases
in which the death penalty had been applied, but it was reported to be
common for individuals accused of such offences to be arrested, tried,
convicted, and imprisoned on the basis of spurious evidence.
From this brief description of the issues, two straightforward recommendations emerged. The first was to strengthen fair trial procedures
so as to ensure that no one is convicted on the basis of flimsy evidence,
but that still left open the question of whether there should be any such
offence as witchcraft in the first place. The second was to eliminate the
death penalty for this offence. Unless the offence involved an act of
intentional murder, the imposition of the death penalty would be illegal under international law, which requires the list of capital offences
to be restricted to those involving the “most serious crimes.”
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It was also not difficult to recommend that the killing of witches
should be prosecuted like any other murder, and that other violent acts
against such individuals should also be prosecuted. Yet this still leaves
open the question of whether or not to criminalize acts of witchcraft
themselves. The concern was expressed that a legal system that fails to
proscribe harmful acts carried out by individuals against others, even
if done under the guise or rubric of magic, would lose credibility and
leave many individuals feeling very vulnerable to being victimized by
witches, who would in turn enjoy immunity from prosecution. Several
other arguments can be invoked in favor of criminalization. One is that
local customs and traditions should be reflected in national law, rather
than being repudiated. This approach might be seen as vindicating the
right to take part in the cultural life of the community, a right that has
long been recognized in international law.4 Another is that the role of
criminal law is to protect citizens against acts of violence, which should
include those carried out by occult means. Another is that the failure of
criminal law to address such acts leads inevitably to vigilantism, as
individuals are forced to take the law into their own hands in order to
achieve what is popularly considered to be a just and fair result.
Yet the arguments on the other side of the balance sheet are even
more powerful. The criminalization of witchcraft by the state reinforces
the social stigmatization of those accused of it. Indeed, the proscription
of witchcraft tends to lead vigilantes, soldiers, and rebels alike to view
the killing of suspected witches as legitimate. It is, moreover, a crime
that lends itself all too readily to the persecution and victimization of
women and children in particular. The biggest problem of all is the
ultimately very subjective nature of the crime and the impossibility of
identifying objective criteria against which alleged acts of witchcraft
can be measured by a court of law. The “facts” upon which allegations of witchcraft are likely to be based will generally be subjective,
imprecise, and highly manipulable. As one observer has expressed
it, “[m]ethods that traditional healers use to detect the secret practice
of sorcery necessarily involve supernatural practices whose logic is
opaque to observers.”5 Taking account of these considerations, I recommended that a clear and immediate message should be sent by
the government by amending the Penal Code to abolish the crime of
witchcraft.
In subsequent visits to Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC), the problem turned out to be both widespread and
chronic in those countries as well. In May 2008, it was reported that

7

Macalester International Vol. 28

eight women and three men in the Kenyan district of Kisii, aged
between 80 and 96, had been accused of witchcraft and dragged out
of their houses and burned alive.6 A similar incident, reported to have
occurred in March 2009 and involving the killing of five persons, was
reported through a video on YouTube.7 It is also clear from a range of
sources that these incidents are just one example of a phenomenon
that is relatively common in certain parts of Kenya. In the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, the main manifestation of the problem affects
children rather than adults.8 It has been reported that tens of thousands of children who have been abandoned or driven out of their
homes and are forced to live on the streets of Kinshasa and other major
cities are especially vulnerable to witchcraft accusations. UNICEF has
estimated that there are 50,000 street children in the DRC. In addition,
“as many as 70 percent of the street children they worked with claimed
to have been accused of witchcraft.”9
Unsurprisingly, this phenomenon is most prevalent in povertystricken communities that lack access to education and social services,
and the victims are often individuals with physical or mental disabilities who are perceived to have “brought defects” into a family or community. UNICEF reported that at least twelve accused child witches
were killed in three provinces (Orientale, Maniema and Katanga) from
September 2008 to early October 2009, mostly by their own family
members. Other sources have reported violence against women in particular, in contexts in which vulnerable members of the community are
blamed for misfortunes, such as the loss of a job or illness.10
In 2010, UNICEF reported a major increase in accusations of witchcraft against children in a range of African countries including Angola,
Benin, Cameroon, and Nigeria, in addition to Kenya and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Those accused were expelled from their
homes, often attacked and beaten, and sometimes killed. The report
identified three different categories of children who were particularly
susceptible to such abuse: (1) those who were orphaned, suffered from
a physical or psychological disability, had an illness such as epilepsy, or
whose behavior was considered abnormal; (2) children who were subject to abnormal births, including a premature or otherwise unusual
birth such as conjoined twins, etc.; and (3) albino children whose body
organs are believed to have magic powers.11 While traditional healers
are often involved in the victimization of such children, recent reports
also emphasize the growing role of churches and cults that encourage
exorcism of “evil spirits.”12 While there are no reliable statistics for
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what remains a dramatically under-reported phenomenon, my own
estimate, based on visits to several of the key concerned countries in
Africa and reports published in relation to a range of other countries,
is that thousands of so-called witches, overwhelmingly women and
children, are killed each year in Africa alone.
Furthermore, the problem is by no means confined to Africa.13 Many
other examples might be given, but it will suffice for present purposes
to mention a case from Saudi Arabia, which seems emblematic of the
problems involved in the criminalization of witchcraft. Fawzah Falih
Muhammad Ali was sentenced to death in 2006 for the offences of
witchcraft, recourse to supernatural beings, and slaughtering animals.
In an analysis of the case, Human Rights Watch noted that the crime
of witchcraft is not defined in Saudi law and that in order to find the
defendant guilty the court had relied upon reports of events which, by
definition, could not be causally linked to the defendant. The events
included one instance in which a man was said to have become impotent after being bewitched, and another in which “a divorced woman
reportedly returned to her ex-husband during the month predicted by
the witch.” The proceedings are also alleged to have violated a range
of due process requirements, thus resulting in an unfair trial.14
This case study of witchcraft and the killing of those alleged to be
its practitioners serves to illustrate a number of challenges to international law. First, unlike violations of human rights that involve crossborder activities or give rise to consequences that have an international
dimension, the murder of witches can be characterized as primarily a
domestic problem without necessary international ramifications. This
raises the question of the conditions under which the international
community should intervene in relation to practices or problems that
are essentially within the domestic affairs of a state. But international
law, especially operating on the basis of treaties which have now been
very widely ratified, provides a solid foundation upon which the international community as a whole, and even other states, can express
concern over any alleged violations that have occurred.
The second challenge concerns violations that are attributed not to
governments, which clearly are bound by international standards, but
to non-state actors that, by definition, cannot sign on to human rights
treaties and should, in principle, be accountable only to the national
government. In many, although certainly not all, of the instances in
which witches have been killed, there is no direct government involvement. Rather, it is private actors, often in isolated communities, who
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carry out the killings. Many other types of extrajudicial executions are
carried out directly by the police or military or other governmental
agents, and in such cases the responsibility of the state is not in question and the means by which accountability can be sought is through
the application of the normal rules of international law relating to
state responsibility. But the process is different where private actors
are involved and there is no obvious state dimension. In those situations, international law has achieved a major breakthrough by holding
the relevant governments liable in situations in which they have not
shown “due diligence” in carrying out their own obligations to investigate, prosecute, and punish those who commit such crimes. Thus, in
many witchcraft situations, the claim can reasonably be made that the
state has become responsible for the fate of the witches because of its
failure to punish the perpetrators and the fact that the victimization
and killings continue largely unabated.
Third, there is generally an important cultural dimension to incidents involving the killing of witches, which is not the case in relation
to the type of killings addressed in the second half of this article. In
other words, witchcraft-related killings may seek to be justified on the
basis of local traditions which attach legitimacy and importance to the
role of traditional faith healers and which also sanction the punishment of those who are deemed to have used their spiritual powers
to achieve evil ends. In such circumstances, it might be argued that
outsiders should not interfere in complex matters involving culture
and tradition, and that the local community should have a free hand to
determine the most appropriate response. This raises the controversial
question of cultural relativism, the implications of which go far beyond
the limited confines of the present article. Suffice it to say that even in
relation to what appear to be clear-cut violations of national and international standards, there may well be issues of sensitivity to cultural
contexts and traditions which will have a significant impact on the way
in which the international community can best tackle the problem.
The example of witchcraft killings thus helps to illustrate a number
of the challenges that confront the international human rights regime
more broadly. It also serves as a contrast in various respects to the type
of challenges that emerge from the very different (but nonetheless
related) problem of how to respond to targeted killings undertaken
through the use of robotic technologies.
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III. Robotic Technologies
A. Introduction
The forerunners to the robotic killers of the future are today’s unmanned
aerial vehicles, or drones, as they are commonly known. Since at least
2002, but with dramatically increased frequency over the past year
or more, these vehicles have been used to carry out targeted killings.
In doing so, civilians have also been killed, although the estimates of
their numbers range from a figure of forty or so, suggested in unattributed briefings by Central Intelligence Agency officials, to many
hundreds, according to civil society groups. While most of the controversy attaches to killings by the United States in the border regions
of Pakistan and Afghanistan, more than forty countries already have
drone technology. Some of these, including China, France, India, Israel,
Russia, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, either have or are seeking
drones capable of shooting laser-guided missiles weighing as much
as 500 pounds in total.15 On “Defense Industry Day,” August 22, 2010,
the Iranian president unveiled a new drone with a range of 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) and capable of carrying four cruise missiles.16 He
referred to the drone as a “messenger of honour and human generosity
and a saviour of mankind,” but warned ominously that it can also be
“a messenger of death for enemies of mankind.”17
As I grappled with the problem of the legality under international
law of developments that seem almost certain to involve a dramatically
increasing use of drones to carry out targeted killings of individuals, I
was also forced to confront an even more complex set of issues. In the
foreseeable future, the technology will exist to create robots capable
of targeting and killing without the need for direct human control or
authorization. The question is how should international law deal with
such developments? Are they matters that should be left to the discretion of the states concerned or do existing laws and ethical standards
already provide an adequate framework? Should the law adopt a different approach to killings such as these, carried out in accordance
with procedures established under national law and with clinical precision, as opposed to killings of an arbitrary nature in settings where
no law seems to count in any meaningful sense?
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B. The Relevance of Human Rights
Over the last decade, the number and type of unmanned or robotic systems developed for and deployed in armed conflict and law enforcement contexts has grown at an astonishing pace. The speed, reach,
capabilities, and automation of robotic systems are all rapidly increasing. Unmanned technologies already in use or in later stages of development—including unmanned airplanes, helicopters, and aquatic and
ground vehicles—can be controlled remotely to carry out a wide array
of tasks: surveillance, reconnaissance, checkpoint security, neutralization of an improvised explosive device, biological or chemical weapon
sensing, removal of debris, search and rescue, street patrols, and more.
They can also be equipped with weapons to be used against targets or
in self-defense. Some of these technologies are semi-automated, and
can, for example, land, take-off, fly, or patrol without human control.
Robotic sentries, including towers equipped with surveillance capacity
and machine guns, are in use at the borders of some countries. In the
foreseeable future, the technology will exist to create robots capable of
targeting and killing with minimal human involvement or without the
need for direct human control or authorization.
Some of this technology is either unambiguously beneficial or can be
used to clearly positive effect, including, most importantly, saving the
lives of civilians and limiting military personnel casualties. However,
the rapid growth of these technologies, especially those with lethal
capacities and those with decreased levels of human control, raise serious concerns that have been almost entirely unexamined by human
rights or humanitarian actors, although some military lawyers, philosophers, ethicists, and roboticists have begun to do so.18 The general
lack of international attention to this issue is understandable. Other
humanitarian or human rights issues—disastrous floods in Pakistan,
killing and sexual violence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
or gang killings in Mexico—seem far more immediately pressing, and
resources, time, and staffing capacities in the U.N., NGOs, and think
tanks are always stretched. In addition, anything that smacks of science fiction seems more at home in an Asimov novel or Terminator
film rather than in a human rights report.
Various factors explain why the human rights community continues to see advances in robotics as an exotic topic that does not need to
be addressed until the relevant technologies are actually in use. First,
much of the information about these developments remains confined
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to military research establishments and specialist scientific literature.
Second, understanding the technologies requires expertise beyond that
of most human rights experts. Third, the attractions of greater use
of robotic technologies greatly overshadow, in the public mind, the
potential disadvantages. And finally, there is a North-South dimension
in that the Global North has the money and the technical know-how to
develop the technologies, while many of the negative consequences of
their use will fall much more heavily on poorer countries in the Global
South.
The analysis that follows is predicated on two principal assumptions: (1) the new robotic technologies have very important ramifications in terms of the right to life and the fight against extrajudicial
executions, and they raise issues that need to be addressed now rather
than later; and (2) although a large part of the research and technological innovation currently being undertaken is driven by military and
related concerns, there is no inherent reason why human rights and
humanitarian law considerations cannot be proactively factored in to
the design and operationalization of the new technologies. But this will
not happen unless and until the human rights community presses the
key public and private actors to make sure it does. Because the human
rights dimensions cannot be addressed in isolation, there is an urgent
need to address the legal, political, ethical, and moral implications of
the development of lethal robotic technologies.
C. Trends in the Development of Lethal Robotic Technology
While the use of lethal robots in the context of war is not unprecedented,19 their development and use has dramatically increased since
the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts, and
the enormous growth in military research and development that the
conflicts precipitated. Military experts have noted that the two conflicts are serving as real-time laboratories of “extraordinary development” for “robotic warfare.”20
The primary user of this technology is the United States. Between
2000 and 2008, the number of U.S. unmanned aircraft systems increased
from less than fifty to over 6,000.21 Similarly, the number of unmanned
ground vehicles deployed by the U.S. Department of Defense increased
from less than 100 in 2001 to nearly 4,400 by 2007.22 Other states, including Canada, Germany, Australia, France, the United Kingdom, Israel,
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and South Korea, have also developed or are developing unmanned
systems.23
Presently, the robotic weapons technologies most in use are systems
that are remotely, but directly, operated by a human being. A wellknown example is the “BomBot,” a vehicle which can be driven by
remote control to an improvised explosive device (IED), drop an explosive charge on the IED, and then be driven away before the charge
is detonated.24 Another example is the Special Weapons Observation
Reconnaissance Detection System (SWORDS) and its successor, the
Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System (MAARS). SWORDS is a
small robot that can be mounted with almost any weapon that weighs
less than 300 pounds, including machine guns, rifles, grenade launchers, and rocket launchers, and can travel in a variety of terrains.25 It
can be operated by remote control and video cameras from up to two
miles away, and be used for street patrols and checkpoint security as
well as to guard posts. MAARS is similar, but can carry more powerful
weapons and can also be mounted with less-than-lethal weapons such
as tear gas.26
The level of automation that generally exists in currently deployed
systems is limited to the ability of, for example, an unmanned combat
aerial vehicle or a laser-guided bomb to be programmed to take-off
and navigate or de-ice by itself, or with only human monitoring (as
opposed to control). In June 2010, trials were held in which helicopters
carried out fully autonomous flights.27 Sentry systems also exist, which
can patrol automatically around a sensitive storage facility or a base.
The Mobile Detection Assessment and Response System (MDARS), for
instance, is a small “robotic patrol force on wheels designed to relieve
personnel of the repetitive and sometimes dangerous task of patrolling
exterior areas” and can “autonomously [perform] random patrols.”28
For currently existing systems that have lethal capability, the choice of
target and the decision to fire the weapon is made by human beings,
and it is a human being who actually fires the weapon, albeit by remote
control. With such weapons systems, there is, in military terminology, a
“man in the loop,” so that the determination to use lethal force, as with
any other kind of weapon, lies with the operator and the chain of command. Examples of such semi-automated weapons systems currently
in use include Predator and Reaper drones,29 deployed in the conflicts
in Iraq and Afghanistan by the United States and the United Kingdom,
and Israeli Harpy drones. Systems that would replace this generation
of technology include the Sky Warrior, an unmanned aircraft system
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capable of taking off and landing automatically, with the capacity to
carry and fire four Hellfire missiles.30
“Swarm” technologies are also being developed to enable a small
number of military personnel to control a large number of machines
remotely. One system under development envisions that a single operator will monitor a group of semi-autonomous aerial robotic weapons
systems through a wireless network that connects each robot to the
others and to the operator. Each robot within a “swarm” would fly
autonomously to a designated area, “and will ‘detect’ threats and targets through the use of artificial intelligence (AI), sensory information
and image processing.”31 Robotic technology is also becoming faster
and more capable of increasingly rapid response. Military strategic
documents predict the development of technology that speeds up the
time needed for machines to respond to a perceived threat with lethal
force “to micro or nanoseconds…Increasingly humans will no longer
be ‘in the loop’ but rather ‘on the loop’—monitoring the execution of
certain decisions.”32 The speed of the envisioned technology would be
enhanced by networking among unmanned machines which would be
able to “perceive and act” faster than humans can.
To date, armed robotic systems operating on any more than a semiautomated basis have not been used against targets. Some states’
military representatives indicate that humans will, for the foreseeable
future, remain in the loop on any decisions to use lethal force.33 The
U.S. Department of Defense, for example, has stated that: “For a significant period into the future, the decision to pull the trigger or launch
a missile from an unmanned system will not be fully automated,” but
notes that “[m]any aspects of the firing sequence will,” even if the final
“decision to fire will not likely be fully automated until legal, rules of
engagement, and safety concerns have all been thoroughly examined
and resolved.”34 However, some roboticists note that the “advent of
autonomous lethal robotic systems is well underway and it is a simple
matter of time before autonomous engagements of targets are present on the battlefield.”35 A number of countries are already reportedly
deploying or developing systems with the capacity to take humans out
of the lethal decision-making loop. For example:
• Since approximately 2007, Israel has deployed remote-controlled
7.62 mm machine-guns mounted on watch-towers every few hundred yards along its border with Gaza as part of its “Sentry Tech”
weapons system, also known as “Spot and Shoot” or in Hebrew,
“Roeh-Yoreh” (Sees-Fires).36 This “robotic sniper” system locates
15
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potential targets through sensors and transmits information to an
operations command center where a soldier can locate and track the
target and shoot to kill.37 Dozens of alleged terrorists have been shot
with the Sentry Tech system.38 The first reported killing of an individual with Sentry Tech appears to have taken place during Operation Cast Lead in December 2008.39 Two alleged terrorists were
killed using the system in December 2009,40 and another person was
killed and four injured by Sentry Tech in March 2010; according
to media accounts it is unclear whether the dead and injured were
farmers or gunmen.41 Future plans envision a “closed loop” system,
in which no human intervention would be required in the identification, targeting, and kill process.42
• South Korea has developed the SGR-1, an unmanned gun tower.
Beginning in July 2010, it is performing sentry duty on an experimental basis in the demilitarized zone between North and South
Korea.43 The SGR-1 uses heat and motion detectors and pattern recognition algorithms to sense possible intruders; it can alert remotelylocated command center operators who can use the SGR-1’s audio
and video communications system to assess the threat and make
the decision to fire the robot’s 5.5 millimeter machine gun.44 Media
accounts indicate that although the decision to use lethal force is
made by human commanders now, the robot has been equipped
with the capacity to fire on its own.45
Such automated technologies are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and artificial intelligence reasoning and decision-making abilities
are actively being researched and receive significant funding. States’
militaries and defense industry developers are working to develop
“fully autonomous capability” such that “technological advances in
artificial intelligence will enable [unmanned aerial vehicles] to make
and execute complex decisions,” including the identification of human
targets and the ability to kill them.46 A 2003 U.S. Joint Forces Command commissioned study reportedly predicted the development
of “artificial intelligence and automatic target recognition [that] will
give robots the ability to hunt down and kill the enemy with limited
human supervision by 2015.”47 Among the envisioned uses for fully
automated weapons systems are: “non-lethal through lethal crowd
control, dismounted offensive operations, and armed reconnaissance
and assault operations.”48 One already developed ground robot, the
Guardium UGV, is a high-speed vehicle that can be weaponized and
16
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used for combat support as well as border patrols and other security
missions, such as perimeter security at airports and power plants.49
D. Concerns
Although robotic or unmanned weapons technology has developed at
an astonishing rate, the public debate over the legal, ethical, and moral
issues arising from its use is at a very early stage, and very little consideration has been given to the international legal framework necessary for dealing with the resulting issues.
There are many possible advantages flowing from the use of existing and developing technologies.50 They may be able to act as “force
multipliers,” greatly expanding the capacity or reach of a military, and
robots may be sacrificed or sent into hazardous situations too risky for
human soldiers. They may be less economically costly than deploying
humans. And indeed, their destruction does not result in the ending
of irreplaceable human life. In the words of a U.S. government report,
“[m]ore and more robots are being destroyed or damaged in combat
instead of Servicemen and women being killed or wounded, and this is
the preferred outcome.”51 Robots may be able to use lethal force more
conservatively than humans (because they “do not need to have selfpreservation as a foremost drive”52), and their actions and responses
may be faster, based on information processed from more sources, and
more accurate, enabling them to reduce collateral damage and other
errors made by humans. They may also be able to avoid mistakes or
harms resulting from human emotions or states, such as fear, tiredness, and the desire for revenge. And to the extent that machines are
equipped with the ability to record operations and monitor compliance with legal requirements, they may increase military transparency
and accountability.
These hypothetical advantages, however, may not necessarily be
reflected in the design or programming of actual technologies. And the
reality, to date, is that technological developments have far outpaced
even discussions of the humanitarian and human rights implications
of the deployment of lethal robotic technologies. The following concerns are among those that require in-depth examination:53
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1. Definitions
The lack of a uniform set of definitions of key terms such as “autonomous,” “autonomy,” or “robots” constitutes a significant obstacle to
addressing the legal and ethical ramifications of these technologies.
Uses of these terms vary significantly among the militaries of different
nation-states, as well as among defense industry personnel, academics, and civilians.54 Confusion can result, for example, from differences
over whether “autonomous” describes the ability of a machine to act
in accordance with moral and ethical reasoning ability, or whether it
might simply refer to the ability to take action independent of human
control (e.g., a programmed drone that can take off and land without
human direction, or a thermometer that registers temperatures).55 As
the international community begins to debate robotic technologies, it
will need to at least seek a shared understanding of the systems and
their characteristics.

2. International and Criminal Responsibility
One of the most important issues flowing from increased automation
is the question of responsibility for civilian casualties or other harms
or violations of the laws of war. As I have analyzed at length elsewhere,56 international human rights and humanitarian law, as applied
in the context of armed conflict or law enforcement, set standards
that are designed to protect or minimize harm to civilians, and set
limits on the use of force by states’ militaries, police, or other armed
forces. When these limits are violated, states may be internationally
responsible for the wrongs committed, and officials or others may bear
individual criminal responsibility. Both the international human rights
and humanitarian law frameworks are predicated on the fundamental
premise that they bind states and individuals, and seek to hold them
to account. When robots are operated by remote control and the ultimate decision to use lethal force is made by humans, individual and
command responsibility for any resulting harms is generally readily
determinable.
However, as automation increases, the frameworks of state and
individual responsibility become increasingly difficult to apply. Who
is responsible if a robot kills civilians in violation of applicable international law—the programmer who designed the program governing
the robot’s actions, any military officials who may have approved the
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programming, a human commander assigned responsibility for that
robot, a soldier who might have exercised oversight but opted not to
do so? What if the killing is attributed to a malfunction of some sort?
Is the government that deployed the robot responsible, or the principal
engineer or manufacturer, or the individual who bore ultimate responsibility for programing, or someone else? What level of supervision
does a human need to exercise over a robot in order to be responsible
for its actions? Are circumstances conceivable in which robots could
legitimately be programmed to act in violation of the relevant international law, or conversely, could they be programmed to automatically
override instructions that they consider, under the circumstances, to
be a violation of that law? Are there situations in which it would be
appropriate to conclude that no individual should be held accountable
despite the clear fact that unlawful actions have led to civilian or other
deaths?
Some argue that robots should never be fully autonomous, that it
would be unethical to permit robots to autonomously kill, because
no human would clearly be responsible and the entire framework of
accountability would break down. Others, such as Ronald Arkin, argue
that it will be possible to design ethical systems of responsibility.57 In
his view, robots could be better ethical decision-makers than humans
because they lack emotion and fear. In addition, they could be programmed to ensure compliance with humanitarian law standards and
applicable rules of engagement. Still others respond that such thinking is predicated on unproven assumptions about the nature of rules
and how robots may be programmed to understand them, and that it
underestimates the extent to which value systems and ethics inform
the application of the rules in ways that robots cannot replicate.58 In
order to understand how to apportion responsibility for violations of
the law, say some ethicists, more research needs to be done both to
understand how and why humans themselves decide to follow the law
and ethical rules, as well as the extent to which robotic programming
mimics or differs from human decision-making.
To the extent that unmanned systems are not being designed to
support investigation, they raise additional transparency and accountability concerns. Perhaps most troublingly from an international law
perspective, some have indicated that, “unmanned systems are not
designed to support investigation. They do not archive information.”
They leave open the possibility of “soldiers pointing to the machine,
declaring, ‘I’m not responsible—the machine is.’”59 In order to comport
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with the international law obligation of a state to provide accountability for the use of lethal force, any unmanned weapons system, regardless of the degree of automation, must not hinder—and indeed should
facilitate—the state’s ability to investigate wrongful conduct.

3. Safeguards and Standards for Deployment
Another significant problem concerns the ability of robots to comply
with human rights and humanitarian law, and the standards relevant
to programming and the development of technology for deployment.
What standards or testing must be conducted before armed machines
are able to conduct crowd control, patrol in civilian populated areas, or
be enabled to decide to target an alleged combatant? While any kind of
technology has the potential to malfunction and result in lethal error,
the particular concern with the rapid development of robotic weapons
is whether (and the extent to which) technical safeguards are built
into the systems to prevent the inadvertent or otherwise wrongful or
mistaken use of lethal force. What programming or other technical
safeguards have been and should be put in place to ensure that the
precautions required by international humanitarian law are taken?
What programming safeguards would international humanitarian law
require?
Troublingly, military and civilian experts acknowledge that robotic
development in general is being driven by the defense industry, and
“[f]ew systems in the field have been subjected to rigorous or standardized testing or experimentation.”60 The U.S. military, for instance,
admits that in the interests of saving military lives in the conflicts in
Iraq and Afghanistan, robotic systems may be deployed without the
requisite testing for whether those systems are in fact reliable.61
In the context of armed conflict generally, and especially in urban
areas, military personnel often have difficulty discriminating between
those who may be lawfully targeted (combatants or those directly participating in hostilities) and civilians, who may not. Such decision-making requires the exercise of judgment, sometimes in rapidly changing
circumstances and in a context that is not readily amenable to categorization as to whether the applicable legal requirements of necessity and
proportionality are met and whether all appropriate precautions have
been taken. It is not clear what criteria would be used to determine if a
robot is ever capable of making such decisions in the manner required,
or how to evaluate the programs that might purport to have inte-
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grated all such considerations into a given set of instructions to guide
a robotic technology.
In addition, there is the concern that the development of lethal
capacity has outpaced the development of safeguards against technical or communications error. For example, military strategic planning
documents caution that it “may be technically feasible” for unmanned
aerial systems (UAS) to have nuclear strike capability before safeguards are developed for the systems, and that “[e]thical discussions
and policy decisions must take place in the near term in order to guide
the development of future UAS capabilities, rather than allowing the
development to take its own path.”62
There are also questions about how and when the benefits of
speedy processing of intelligence and other data is outweighed by the
risks posed by hasty decision-making. Man-on-the-loop systems, for
instance, raise the concern that technology is being developed that is
beyond the human capacity to supervise effectively and in accordance
with applicable law. With respect to swarm technologies, some research
has found that human operators’ performance levels are reduced by an
average of 50 percent when they control even two unmanned aircraft
systems at a time.63 The research suggests that the possibility of lethal
error rises as humans play a “supervisory” role over a larger number
of machines. Unless adequate precautions are taken and built into systems, the likelihood increases that mistakes will be made which will
amount to clear violations of the applicable laws.
A related concern is what safeguards should or must be put in place
to prevent ultimate human control of robots from being circumvented,
and what safeguards can be implemented to prevent lethal robots from
being hacked or used by, for example, insurgent or terrorist groups.

4. Civilian Support
An important political consideration is whether the widespread use of
robots in civilian settings, such as for law enforcement in cities or in
counter-insurgency operations, would alienate the very populations
they were meant to assist. Over-reliance on technology increases the
risk that policymakers and commanders will focus on the relatively
easy use of armed or lethal tactics to the detriment of all the other
elements necessary to end a conflict—including winning hearts and
minds—and that policymakers will overestimate the ability of new
technologies to achieve sustainable peace. In addition, while robots
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may have the benefit of not acting based on emotion, they also do
not have the kind of sympathy, remorse, or empathy that often appropriately tempers and informs the conduct of fighters and their commanders.

5. Use of Force Threshold and Jus ad Bellum Considerations
To the extent that decisions about whether to go to war are limited by
the prospect of loss of life of military personnel and the high economic
cost of warfare, robotic armies may make it easier for policymakers
to choose to enter into an armed conflict, increasing the potential for
violating jus ad bellum requirements. This may be particularly the case
when the other side lacks the same level of technology. Similarly, within
the context of armed conflict, insofar as robots are remotely controlled
by humans who are themselves in no physical danger, there is the
concern that an operator’s location far from the battlefield will encourage a “Playstation” mentality to fighting and killing. The threshold
at which, for example, drone operators would be willing to use force
could potentially decrease. Thus, the international community should
consider whether and when reduced risk to a state’s armed forces
resulting from the extensive use of robotic technologies might unacceptably increase the risk to civilian populations on the opposing side.
To summarize, in relation to the development and use of robotic technologies, especially those with the potential to be used in warfare,
there is a pressing need to give more sustained consideration to the
legal, ethical, and moral challenges that are likely to emerge. Particular
attention should be given to identify ways in which proactive steps
can be taken to ensure that such technologies are optimized in terms of
their capacity to promote more effective compliance with international
human rights and humanitarian law.
One way forward would be for the United Nations Secretary-General to convene a group consisting of military and civilian representatives from states, leading authorities in human rights and humanitarian
law, applied philosophers and ethicists, scientists, and weapons developers to advise on measures and guidelines designed to promote that
goal. In that context, consideration could be given to requiring that
any unmanned or robotic weapons system have the same—or better—
safety standards as comparable manned systems. Guidelines should
be considered in terms of requiring tests to ensure minimum stan-
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dards of reliability and performance before new lethal technologies
are deployed. In the design of new technologies, efforts should also be
made to promote the inclusion of recording systems and other ways
to facilitate effective investigation of instances in which it is alleged
that the weapon has been used in violation of the applicable law. In
addition, such a group could address the need for greater definitional
uniformity in relation to the types of technology being developed, the
need for empirical studies to better understand the human rights implications of the technologies, and the fundamental question of whether
lethal force should ever be permitted to be fully automated.
IV. Conclusion
While the differences between the two case studies of extrajudicial executions considered in this article—the killing of witches and targeted
killings by robotic technologies—are certainly significant, the key point
for present purposes concerns the similarity between the two when
viewed from the perspective of the international human rights regime.
The norms reflected therein clearly aim to protect the right to life of all
individuals in times of peace, and to protect the lives of civilians and
non-combatants in times of armed conflict. Although those goals have
been accepted in one form or another by all governments in the world,
this does not mean that the move from broad normative acceptance to
compliance in practice is easy or straightforward. Indeed, the paired
example of witches and robots illustrates very clearly the principal
challenges that consistently arise in response to endeavors to promote
respect for these abstract norms in concrete situations.
Governments and their supporters, whether in response to allegations of using new technologies to carry out targeted killings or of not
taking adequate action in response to the killing of witches, are likely
to resort to defensive strategies that are remarkably similar. Often,
the first step will be to assert that the issue in question is a matter
exclusively for the sovereign decision-making authority of the state
and thus not a legitimate matter for international concern. Despite its
regular and predictable invocation by governments that are subject to
criticism, this argument is rarely taken seriously, even by other governments. Human rights are now widely accepted as matters of legitimate
concern for all governments and the international community as a
whole.
This argument thus gives way to a second step, which is to argue
that while the basic norm (in this case the right not to be arbitrarily
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deprived of one’s life) is entirely accepted, its agreed upon interpretation does not extend so far as to clearly and unequivocally cover the
particular practices being challenged. At the same time, a claim to the
moral high ground will be asserted by calling for new norms to govern
the relevant problem.64
The third response will be that national law and institutions are
adequate to deal with the matter. Thus, for example, the government
of the Central African Republic might point to the fact that, under its
criminal code, a person convicted of witchcraft can face capital punishment, a prison sentence, or a fine. And the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo might draw attention to the constitutional
prohibition of parental abandonment of children for alleged sorcery,
as well as to the 2009 Child Protection Law, which provides for a
prison sentence for any adult, including parents, who accuse children
of witchcraft. Similarly, the United States government will draw attention to its detailed standards governing the conduct of the military and
combine this with a commitment to ensure that everything possible is
done to ensure compliance with relevant international standards. The
problem, of course, will often be in the implementation of such standards in practice, rather than with the law on the books.
The fourth standard response by governments is to contest the
facts and claim that the allegations cannot be proved. While this latter
approach raises empirical rather than normative issues, it highlights
one of the most difficult challenges for the international human rights
regime, which is to meet even a fairly basic burden of proof in relation
to complex allegations.
This array of responses to alleged unlawful killings also brings into
clear relief the main challenges that the regime faces. In essence, they
are threefold. The first is the creation of public awareness of the issues,
followed by more sustained reflection both by civil society and governments on the best approaches to be adopted in order to give effect to
the human rights commitment. The second is to ensure the constant
normative development of the basic standards so that their significance
and implications in specific contexts are better understood and their
content is elaborated and expanded upon to enable them to deal with
new issues and problems. Third, and in some ways the most important
because of its role in relation to the first two, is to develop institutional
arrangements at the international level to both facilitate the normative
evolution of the standards and to promote compliance by states and
other actors with the norms. 
•
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